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Abstract
Labor productivity is a key indicator in economic analysis. Numerous aggregative
formulae exist for calculating labor productivity growth at the firm-level, with the result
that the contribution of each firm to total labor productivity growth varies according to the
formulae used in its calculation. In this study, we systematically derive many aggregative
formulae. Using one of these formulae, we examine the link between labor productivity
growth at the firm-level and that at the industry-level, and identify the situations in which
the former is not correlated with the latter. A central concept in this study is the
clarification of a strategic decomposition. Our strategic decomposition uses a very simple
formula and can be used to solve the problem of maximizing the increase of total labor
productivity for a few years. We use numerical examples to illustrate new methods for
solving this problem.
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1. Introduction
Labor productivity is a key indicator used in economic analysis and is sometimes
computed by agencies, organizations, and scholars, including the OECD, ILO, and BLS
(see, OECD 2001, 2015; ILO 2014; BLS 2008; Dean 1999; Jorgenson and Stiroh 2001;
Schreyer and Pilat 2001; Pilat and Schreyer 2004; Timmer et al. 2007, 2010; Holman et al.
2008; O’Mahony and Timmer 2009; Lewrick et al. 2014; Diewert 2015; Reinsdorf 2015).
In this study, we systematically derive many aggregative formulae for labor productivity
growth at a firm-level, to which little attention has been given. These derivations are one of
the aims of this study.
Using one of these formulae, we also examine the link between labor productivity
growth (or decline) at the firm-level and that at the industry-level (i.e., total labor
productivity growth), and identify the situations in which the former is not correlated with
the latter. Regarding this link, we expose some important properties required for an
aggregative formula. From these discussions and on examination of all the derived
aggregations, we formulate a strategic decomposition that is a central concept of this study.
The decomposition tells us that firm labor productivity in the base period is a misleading
signal to increase total labor productivity.
Strategic decomposition can solve the problem of maximizing the increase in total labor
productivity for a few years. Thus, we illustrate methods of solving this problem using
strategic decomposition. The derivation and applications of the strategic decomposition are
main aims of this study.
The labor productivity of the ith firm at period t (t=0, 1, 2, …), pit, is defined by pit =
yit/hit, where yit > 0 and hit > 0 are, respectively, the real output2 and labor input (total hours
worked) of a firm during a certain period. Labor productivity at the industry-level including
such the firm, Pt, is then defined by Pt = Yt/Ht, where Yt denotes the real output of the
industry and Ht the labor input. Herein, Yt = Σyit and Ht = Σhit. (In this paper, the summation
(Σ) and product (Π) are always made over all firms belonging to the same industry as the
subject firm, so the indexes of those are suppressed. Besides, yt is measured by netting out
all the inter-firm transactions in that industry.)
Simple aggregative formulae of labor productivity at period t are:
(1)
(2)
wherein ait = yit/Yt and bit = hit/Ht are, respectively, the ith firm’s shares of real output and
labor input in that industry. The aggregation (1) is the weighted arithmetic mean of pit, the
sum of which weights, bit, equals unity. In contrast, the aggregation (2) is the weighted
harmonic mean of pit, the sum of which weights, ait, also equals unity. As shown in the two
equations, two shares link productivity at the industry-level and that at the firm-level.
2 Thus, we do not consider each individual price. For the deflators, see Reinsdorf (2015).
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These shares will play a key role later. In addition, ait/bit = pit/Pt always holds for any ith
firm at period t and will be used repeatedly. We elaborate upon the aggregation for the
growth or decline of firms’ labor productivity. That is, we elaborate upon the total labor
productivity quotient (TLPQ), Pt+1/Pt, using these shares and decompose it into the
contributions of individual firm.3 We also discuss total labor productivity rate (TLPR)
(Pt+1－Pt)/Pt.
A familiar decomposition of TLPR, which will be exhibited in Subsection 5.1, is shown
as the formula in which the numerator (Pt+1 and Pt) is derived by the extreme right of (1)
and its denominator is given by Pt = Yt/Ht (for example, Tang and Wang 2004; Vijselaar
and Albers 2004; De Avillez 2012; Dumagan 2013). Because this formula use only bit at
first, it suffers a serious defect that will be explained later. We do not agree with its use. As
mentioned above, the two shares, ait and bit, are equivalently important.
Here we refer to an aggregation whereby either ait or bit (or, L(ai) or L(bi)) is employed to
derive TLPQ (or logarithmic TLPQ) at the first procedure as a single-handed aggregation,
and to one whereby both ait and bit are employed to do so as a double-handed aggregation.
After that, the formula may include both ait and bit. Later, L(ai) and L(bi) will be defined.
(For ait/bit, L(ai/bi), etc., see Appendix A.)
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss an additive
formula of TLPQ, which includes two formulae; single-handed and double-handed. This
section shows a generalized aggregation. In Section 3, we discuss a multiplicative formula
of TLPQ, which also includes two formulae. We also explain a logarithmic mean that is
indispensable to derive a multiplicative formula. In Section 4, we then express the
relationships between labor productivity at the firm-level and that at the industry-level. In
Section 5, we explain the decomposition of TLPR. The explanation involves showing both
the familiar decomposition above and an approximately generalized decomposition. In
Section 6, we explain a strategic decomposition that can be used to select the most
important firm to perform the largest TLPR in a certain industry. Because our strategic
decomposition is approximated, we need to compare a strategy derived using this
decomposition with one derived by the generalized aggregation. We discuss this important
subject in this section using specific assumptions. The strategic decomposition can also be
used to solve the problem of needing to maximize the increase of the TLPR for a few years.
We thus illustrate some applications using numerical examples in Section 7. This is the
most informative section of the paper. Finally, Section 8 presents some concluding
remarks.
2. Total labor productivity quotient: an additive formula
2.1. Fundamental relations
Our approach to derive an aggregative formula requires some fundamental relations. To
derive an additive formula, we use:
3 Our analysis can also apply to the link between the quotient of labor productivity at the overall
economy level and those at the industry-level.
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(3)
(4)
where the subscript 1 represents the comparison period and 0 the base period.
2.2. Single-handed aggregative formula
We show two aggregations. One is derived by substituting Y1/Y0 in (4) into that in (3).
(Note that we do not substitute H1/H0 or H0/H1 in (4) into that in (3).) This aggregation is
(5)
(The last equations of (5) and (6) are disregarded below, though we use them in Appendix
B.) If where ηit is the ith firm’s real output price as shown in Diewert (2015),
similar procedures deriving (5) will produce (9) in Diewert (2015) (see also our (13)
below). Substituting H0/H1 in (4) into that in (3), we obtain the other aggregation:
(6)
Thus TLPQ, P1/P0, becomes the weighted arithmetic mean of the quotients of labor
productivity at the firm-level, pi1/pi0. The sums of the weights in (5) and (6) are,
respectively, Σai0(bi1/bi0)= (Σbi1pi0)/(Σbi0pi0) and Σbi1(ai0/ai1) = (Σai0/pi1)/(Σai1/pi1). These
ordinarily do not equal unity, because P1/P0 = 1 does not have to hold even if pi1/pi0 = 1 for
all i. This material fact is illustrated in Table 1 in Subsection 7.2 below.
Each term, ai0(bi1/bi0)(pi1/pi0) in (5) and bi1(ai0/ai1)(pi1/pi0) in (6), is considered the
contribution of the ith firm to the TLPQ. Hence, a firm can contribute to TLPQ without
doing anything. That is, the firm that changes neither real output nor labor input can
contribute to TLPQ. We call this a “basic property” that an aggregative formula must
possess. The property may not presently be widely accepted and thus we will repeatedly
examine this point later. As seen in (5) and (6), the firm’s contribution to the TLPQ differs
according to the aggregative formulae. Furthermore, this contribution also varies with
every change of the deflator used (see, for example, De Avillez 2012).
Two aggregations exhibit a serious defect; that is, the firms’ contributions to the TLPQ
are independent of their input or output changes. We call this defect the invariable
contribution (IN-C). All single-handed aggregations below cause the IN-C. Since the defect
is not our main concern, it will be discussed further in Appendix B.
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2.3. Double-handed aggregative formula (the generalized aggregation)
To derive a double-handed formula, we must substitute each term (e.g., Y1/Y0, H1/H0,
and so on) in (4) into that in (3). These procedures lead to two forms:
(7)
(8)
These also tell us that a firm can contribute to TLPQ without doing anything. Although
these aggregations cannot decompose the TLPQ into individual firm contributions, these
approximations that will be shown as (21) and (23) below can. Since the aggregations have
the requisite basic properties and are free from the IN-C, we regard them as suitable
aggregations. We call (7) the generalized aggregation for a simple reference. We can
derive other formulae, one of which causes the IN-C. These other formulae are shown in
Appendix A.
3. Total labor productivity quotient: a multiplicative formula
3.1. Log-change form and a logarithmic mean
A multiplicative formula written in log-change variables employs two differences of
any positive variables. These variables, namely Xt (t = 0 and 1), are given by ΔX = X1－X0
and ΔlogX = logX1－logX0 = log(X1/X0), where the subscript 1 and 0 are the same as above
and the logarithm is natural.
Because a logarithmic mean is indispensable to the derivation of a multiplicative form,
we briefly comment on it (see Carlson 1972; Stolarsky 1975; Vartia 1976; Tsuchida 1997,
2014; Balk 2008). The logarithmic mean, L(X), is defined by
The value of L(X) is always positive and has the limit:
If X1/X0 is also close to 1, it can be approximated by the usual three means: arithmetic,
geometric, and harmonic (see Tsuchida 1997, 2014).
Letting Xt = Σxit, xit > 0, and wit = xit/Xt, an inequality L(X) ≧ ΣL(xi) holds. Moreover,
there exists an aggregation property ΣL(wi)Δlogwi = ΣΔwi = 0, which is valuable in this
paper.
3.2. Fundamental relations
We show some fundamental relations that will be repeatedly used later. The log-change
labor productivity quotient at the firm-level is
(9)
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and that at the industry-level is
(10)
Because ait = yit/Yt and bit = hit/Ht, we have Δlogai = Δlogyi－ΔlogY and Δlogbi =
Δloghi－ΔlogH. Thus, we produce the log-change aggregations as follows:4
(11)
and
(12)
where λ(ai) = L(ai)/(ΣL(aj)), Σλ(ai) = 1, λ(bi) = L(bi)/(ΣL(bj)), and Σλ(bi) = 1. Equation (11)
can be found in Balk (2014, eq. (7)).5
3.3. Single-handed aggregative formula
Using (9), (10), and (11), we have
from which we get
(13)
Note that we do not use (12). This corresponds to the additive aggregation (5) (compare the
derivation procedure of (5) with that of (13)). If the logarithmic mean can be approximated
by the arithmetic mean A(ai), that is, L(ai) ≈ A(ai) ≡ (ai1 + ai0)/2, then we have λ(ai) = A(ai).
Hence, the approximation of (13) is
(14)
This formula is the same as (7) in Stiroh (2002) and (5.4) in Timmer et al. (2010).
Similar procedures using (9), (10), and (12) produce the following multiplicative
aggregation that corresponds to the additive aggregation (6):
Since all these formulae are the single-handed aggregations, they give rise to the IN-C
above, some of which are explained in Appendix B.
4 Notably, ΣL(ai)Δlogai = ΣΔai = 0 and ΣL(bi)Δlogbi = ΣΔbi = 0.
5 We disregard the difference between real and nominal output.
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3.4. Double-handed aggregative formula (the well-known log-change aggregation)
Using (10), (11), and (12), we can quickly derive a double-handed aggregation as
follows:
(15)
This formula can be found in Balk (2014, eq. (19)). If each logarithmic mean can be
approximated by its arithmetic mean, then we have
(16)
While the formulae (15) and (16) have properties similar to the aggregation (A.43) in
OECD (2001), our (15) is an exact and appropriate formula for discrete data. Below, we
call (16) the well-known log-change aggregation (see also OECD 2015).
Equation (15) is rewritten as
(17)
which corresponds to the equation (A.44) in OECD (2001). Given some assumptions, we
have approximations such as λ(ai) ≈ ai0 and λ(bi) ≈ bi0 (see footnote 12 below). Thus, our
(17) approaches the equation (1) in Nordhaus (2002). These three equations, (15), (16), and
(17), are not suitable aggregations, because the ith firm without doing anything cannot
contribute to the logarithmic TLPQ, in which hold.6 That
is, these three equations lack the basic property. Provided that we use other logarithmic
means, we can derive suitable aggregations that do not suffer this fault. Refer to (34), (35),
and so on in Appendix A.
4. Labor productivity at the firm-level and that at the industry-level
Hereafter, we write any ith firm’s output and input in the comparison period as yi1 = yi0(1
+ ui) and hi1 = hi0(1 + vi), given the assumptions −1 < ui < 1 and −1 < vi < 1. These ui and vi
produce a simple form as shown below. We also use the reverse assumptions, such as yi0 =
yi1(1 + ) and hi0 = hi1(1 + ). These ui and vi (or and ) are considered control
variables in the problem of how to increase TLPR, which will be discussed later. (In
Appendix B, ui and vi play main roles.)
Consider the relationships between labor productivity at the firm-level and that at the
industry-level using the generalized aggregation (7). For a simple discussion, there are two
firms (the jth and kth firms) in a certain industry and the jth firm alone changes its output
and input. Thus,
4.1. Unconventional findings
Each firm’s labor productivity quotient, qi (i = j and k), is
6 Note that yi0 = yi1, hi0 = hi1, and pi0 = pi1.
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The TLPQ, Q, is
(18)
because Σai0 = 1 and Σbi0 = 1. Although (18) is the aggregative formula for this simple
case, it cannot compute each firm’s contribution to the TLPQ.
The aggregation (18) guides us to unconventional findings. The jth firm’s labor
productivity growth qj > 1 (or decline qj < 1) is not necessarily consistent with the total
labor productivity growth Q > 1 (or decline Q < 1). (Also see a “productivity paradox”
explained in Fox (2012).) The ratio aj0/bj0 = pj0/P0 plays an important role. If, generally
speaking, the firm’s productivity pj0 is very low compared to the total productivity P0, the
growth (or decline) of the former may lead to the decline (or growth) of the latter.
Moreover, even if uj = vj, that is pj1 = pj0, the total productivity may grow or decline. Refer
to a similar concept called the Denison Effect by Nordhaus (2002), and see also the next
subsection and Section 7. The crucial factors (aj0 and bj0) depend upon the kth firm’s output
and input at the base period. Thus, the kth firm can indirectly contribute to the TLPQ
without doing anything7, though this basic property is repeatedly discussed above.
4.2. Short run production function and a u-v ratio
The Cobb-Douglas production function for the ith firm is:
where cit is total factor productivity (TFP) and kit capital input (adjusted by its degree of
utilization); and are the output elasticities of capital and labor, respectively. In
the short run, we may assume that cit and kit are constants or their log-change values are
proportional to that of labor input; consequently
wherein γi is a constant or null. Thus the short run production function is
wherein . If a positive variable x approaches 1, we can use an approximation
given by log x ≈ x − 1. We call this the log-approximation and will often use it later.
Applying the approximation to the above, we have
(19)
7 Strictly speaking, this is true only if uj ≠ 0 or vj ≠ 0. Putting it another way, facing a stagnating
business, the kth firm made an efficient choice, but the jth firm did not. The choices of these firms
resulted in uk = vk = 0, uj < 0, and vj < 0; and the total labor productivity thus increased.
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and we call εi the ith firm’s u-v ratio. While (19) is an approximation, for simplicity we
consider it the equation in the present discussion.8
Given that the foregoing jth firm has the just mentioned production function, we have:
These equations provide the following additional findings:
Thus, aj0, bj0, and εj clarify relationships between the labor productivity quotient at the
firm-level and that at the industry-level. We should recognize that in many situations
productivity growth (or decline) at the firm-level does not correlate with that at the
industry-level (see Table 1 and Table 2 below).
5. Decomposition of total labor productivity rate
In this section, we explain the decomposing form of only TLPR ( ), since our
main aims are the strategic decomposition and its application, which will be discussed
later.
5.1. Single-handed formula (the familiar decomposition)
We can derive ΔP from (1) as follows:
This relation and P0 lead to the equation regarded as the familiar decomposition:
(20)
wherein we employed the relation for the denominator (remember that
each individual price is not considered). The last equation of (20) is the same as the
equations (3) or (5) in Tang and Wang (2004)9 (see also Vijselaar and Albers 2004; De
Avillez 2012; Dumagan 2013; Reinsdorf 2015). The form designated as “shift-share
8 We can directly use (19) as the assumption without the other assumptions above.
9 Our derivation of (20) is easier than theirs. Note that
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analysis” of TLPR in European Commission (2004, p. 155) becomes the same as (20).10
Since (20) is the single-handed aggregation, this yields the IN-C that is explained in
Appendix B.
5.2. Double-handed formula
Applying the log-approximation to log(P1/P0), log(Y1/Y0), and log(H1/H0) in (10), we
have (P1/P0) − 1 = ΔP/P0 ≈ (Y1/Y0)－(H1/H0). From these and (7), we obtain a formula that
is regarded as an approximately generalized decomposition:
(21)
The contribution of the ith firm to the TLPR is about and is
dependent upon the two control variables.
Because we have
(22)
Note that (22) is not the form used to calculate each firm’s contribution to the TLPR. The
question thus arises of the meaning of the term . For a minute, we call this
the component of the ith firm.
Because (22) leads to our central concept below, we show another derivation using more
permissible assumptions. Then, (7) produces
Hence, we can derive (22) provided the following assumptions hold:
ABS
Applying the log-approximation to (8) produces two approximations:
10 The former is
which is also used in OECD (2014).
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(23)
(24)
Some double-handed multiplicative formulae have simple approximations. Application
of the log-approximation to (15) can yield (22) and (24).11 Similarly, we have two
approximations from (16):
(25)
(26)
The terms in (24) and in (26) are the component of the
ith firm to their TLPR.
Whenever we regulate TLPR, we must distinguish two types of information,
independent and not independent of control variable. We can consider the former ex ante
information and the latter ex post information. Equation (22) needs ex ante information
(two shares at the base period), (24) needs ex post information (two shares at the
comparison period), and (26) needs both ex ante and ex post information. In the below, ex
ante information will turn to active players.
6. Strategic decomposition and comparison test
6.1. Strategic decomposition
Hereafter we assume εi to be ex ante information. Thus we know that the ith firm’s
output will increase (or decrease) by 100εivi percent given an increase (or decrease) in its
input by 100vi percent during those years. Our decomposition (22) then becomes
(27)
Now we try to clarify a strategic decomposition that is our central concept. We use this
terminology to argue for a decomposition of TLPR that satisfies these two conditions:
S1.  It must be derived from the double-handed suitable aggregation or its approximation.
S2. The component of the ith firm must be a function only of its ex ante information (ai0,
bi0, εi, yi0, hi0, pi0, and P0)12 and its control variable (vi).
Although we have shown many aggregations up to here, the derivations of which are
one of the aims of this paper, few aggregations satisfy the condition S1. Other aggregations
11 Note that we have L(X) ≈ X0 or L(X) ≈ X1 since
12 Note that P0 is the ith firm’s ex ante information because ai0/bi0 = pi0/P0.
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that satisfy the condition S1 are found in Appendix A. On these grounds we have
concluded that only the decomposition (27) can satisfy these two conditions. Thus we call
(27) the strategic decomposition. The significance of (27) to the regulation of TLPR will be
understood soon. To avoid confusion, we call in (27) the strategic
component of the ith firm to the TLPR.
6.2. Comparison test
We consider a problem that requires us to select the most important firm to perform the
largest TLPR in a certain industry. Hereafter we may call this solution a strategy. Because
our strategic decomposition (27) is an approximated form, we need to compare the strategy
derived by (27) with that by the generalized aggregation (7). However, we cannot
decompose (7) in a general situation. Hence, we shall discuss the momentous subject using
a specific assumption wherein a single firm (any ith firm) can independently change its
output and input as in Section 4.
From (18), we obtain the criterion C:
(28)
One of the strategies is derived by maximizing C under some conditions. The strategic
decomposition (27) leads to Cs given by
(29)
The other strategy is derived by maximizing Cs under the conditions above
Employing the following six tests, each of which corresponds to εi → ∞, εi = 0, εi > 0, or
εi < 0, we examine whether or not the strategy derived by Cs is the same as that derived by
C. Our discussions only involve the positive results; that is, C > 0 and Cs > 0 (the negative
ones will alike be discussed).13 Thus, there may be no strategies (or solutions).
[1] Comparison test 1: εi → ∞, ui = x, 0 < x < 1, and vi = 0 for any ith firm.14
These conditions imply that any firm can increase its output by100 x percent without
changing its input. (Similar things are implied below.) As in the controlled economy, we
consider a strategy wherein a firm is selected to execute the largest (or near largest) TLPR.
In this test, the values of our strategic decomposition (29) and the criterion (28) are given
by
Maximizing Cs is one of our strategies and tells us that we must select a firm whose is
the highest in that industry. We write this as follows:
13 Note that C and Cs have the same sign.
14 The conditions are obtained because vi = ui /εi.
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.
(Given a group of firms, we may select any one of them.)
Similarly, the other strategy derived by C is
The two strategies are the same and both yield a value that equals ai0x.
[2] Comparison test 2: εi = 0, vi = −x, and 0 < x < 1 for any ith firm.
Thus, we have
The criterion yields the same strategy, because C is a strictly increasing function of bi0.
However, the value computed by (29) is an approximation of that computed by (28).
That is; if the mth firm is selected, the ratio of these values is
where in practice x is a small value (e.g., 0 < x ≤ 0.05).
[3] Comparison test 3: εi = 1, vi = x, and 0 < x < 1 for any ith firm.
which derives
While we can quickly gain the strategy for Max of Cs, we cannot do likewise for Max of
C. (Note that the latter strategy is dependent on x which is unknown. The same holds in
some of the tests below.)
In this test, the strategy derived by Cs may not be the same as that derived by C. Suppose
that the mth firm is selected by Cs and the kth firm by C. We then have the inequality:
wherein bm0 ≥ bk0. Hence the value of the mth firm calculated by (28) nearly equals that of
the kth firm calculated by C. (Remember that we cannot practically solve the Max of C.)
If ai0 = bi0 for all i, there are no solutions since C = 0 and Cs = 0. (We may have a similar
case in test 4 below.) We strongly emphasize that Max {(ai0－bi0) > 0} differs from Max
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{(ai0/bi0) = (pi0/P0) > 1}. So, a firm with the highest productivity in its industry at the base
period may not be selected.15
[4] Comparison test 4: εi = 1, vi = −x, and 0 < x < 1 for any ith firm.
from which we derive
While two strategies are not identical, the difference between two values calculated by
(28) is small since the analogous inequalities hold as in test 3. Additionally, Max
{(bi0－ai0) > 0} differs from Max {(bi0/ai0) = (P0/pi0) > 1}.
[5] Comparison test 5: εi = −1, vi = −x, and 0 < x < 1 for any ith firm.
which derives
Here, Cs also leads to the near-maximum value, since the analogous inequalities as in test 3
hold.
[6] Comparison test 6: εi = −1, vi = x, and 0 < x < 1 for any ith firm.
No solutions exist for the above equations because Cs < 0 and C <0 always hold.
As explained in these tests, our strategy derived by (29) can easily be obtained and
yields the value that equals or nearly equals the maximum value computed by (28). In
contrast, the strategy derived by criterion (28) may not be obtained. Furthermore, consider
the problem of having to select a few firms to increase the TLPR by z present.
Consequently we cannot use criterion (28). Our strategic decomposition is also helpful for
solving such complex problems.
7. Strategic decomposition applied to numerical examples
Assuming firms under the planned economy, we consider circumstances in which a
government must regulate TLPR at a certain industry. Our problem then is how to increase
the TLPR as much as possible within a few years (e.g., 2 years), a problem that we can
solve using strategic decomposition. Therefore, we illustrate methods of solving the
problem using simple numerical examples.
Five firms (j, k, l, m, and n) are involved in the industry and the initial values (that is, ex
ante information), yi0, hi0, ai0, bi0, and so on, which have proper units, are listed in the tables
below. Since εi, which is assumed to be a positive constant for simple discussions, is ex
15 Compare the ith firm having ai0 = 0.6, bi0 = 0.3 and (ai0/bi0) = 2 with the jth firm having aj0 = 0.06,
bj0 = 0.02 and (aj0/bj0) = 3.
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ante information, our control variable is the five-vector of {vi}. We explain two methods to
solve the problem: single-stage and multi-stage. Because the strategic decomposition (27)
is the central concept in this paper, the focus of discussion is on how to use the single-stage
method wherein (27) is ruling to our procedures. Employing the single-stage method, we
can solve the problem immediately, which is very useful for practical purposes. However,
in several cases this may lead to solutions that are nearly correct rather than correct. To
obtain correct solutions, we may employ the multi-stage method. Because it is beyond the
scope of this study, we shall explain only a few examples wherein the multi-stage method
offers advantages over the single-stage one.
7.1. Essential strategy
To increase the TLPR, our strategic decomposition (27) tells us the essential strategies:⦁ if εiai0 − bi0 > 0, then vi > 0,⦁ if εiai0 − bi0 < 0, then vi < 0,⦁ if εiai0 − bi0 = 0, then vi = 0.
Thus, all strategic components become non-negative. Provided the range or value of the
control vector {vi} for a certain period is either given or somehow determined, we can
quickly solve the problem. This assumption is applied in the numerical examples. These
strategies are practical for the government or its agency to regulate total productivity at any
industry. (These strategies may be able to apply to the overall economy.)
When εi = 1 for all i, the strategies demand that we make the ith firm that meets ai0/bi0 =
pi0/P0 > 1 increase its input and make the jth firm that meets aj0/bj0 = pj0/P0 < 1 decrease its
input. This results in reallocation of labor (or workforce) from the lower-productivity firm
to the higher-productivity firm. Notably, lower-productivity (or higher-productivity) does
not indicate pj0 < 1 (or pi0 > 1). Compare this reallocation with that called “dynamic
allocative efficiency” by Haltiwanger (2011). Additionally, productivity differences across
firms may produce total productivity growth. Regarding these topics, see the survey by
Syverson (2011) (see also Berthou and Standoz, 2014).
7.2. Single-stage method
We adopt the essential strategies above. Case 1 shows a nearly correct solution (the
correct one is derived by the multi-stage method below). Only the single-stage method can
quickly solve Cases 2 and 3.
[1] Case 1: for all the ith firms.
By making all the ith (i = j, k, …, n) firms that satisfy ai0 − bi0 > 0 (or ai0 − bi0 < 0)
increase (or decrease) their inputs by 5%, we can obtain the results shown in Table 1. The
column exhibited by “v” tells the strategies. The TLPR increases by about 0.99%;
nevertheless, all pi1’s remain unchanged.16 Hence, productivity growth at the industry-level
does not correlate with that at any firm-level.
The columns exhibited by “StrCom” and “GenDec” indicate, respectively, each firm’s
strategic component and contribution to the TLPR. The former are calculated by (27) and
16 Since εi = 1, qi = 1 for all i. See also Table 4 and Table 5 below.
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the latter by (21). Neither the total equals the TLPR above, since they are approximations.
(The tables below exhibit the same thing.) From the values in StrCom, we can see which
firm is important to increasing the TLPR. The most important firm will be the mth firm,
followed by the jth. While the lth firm’s productivity at the base period is 1.20, its input is
not increased.
Table 1 Regulated results of Case 1
Firm y0 (Y0) h0 (H0) p0 (P0) y1 (Y1) h1 (H1) p1 (P1) q (Q)
j 42 28 1.5000 44.10 29.40 1.50000 1
k 36 27 1.3333 37.80 28.35 1.33333 1
l 18 15 1.2000 18.00 15.00 1.20000 1
m 12 18 0.6667 11.40 17.10 0.66667 1
n 12 12 1.0000 11.40 11.40 1.00000 1
Total 120 100 1.2000 122.70 101.25 1.21185 1.00988
Firm a0 b0 a0 – b0 u v StrCom GenDec
j 0.350 0.280 0.070 0.050 0.050 0.0035 0.0735
k 0.300 0.270 0.030 0.050 0.050 0.0015 0.0315
l 0.150 0.150 0.000 0 0 0 0
m 0.100 0.180 -0.080 -0.050 -0.050 0.0040 -0.0760
n 0.100 0.120 -0.020 -0.050 -0.050 0.0010 -0.0190
Total 1.000 1.000 0.0100 0.0100
Note: The subscripts (j, k, l, m, n) are suppressed; and q = p1 / p0 and Q = P1 / P0.
What do the values exhibited in the GenDec column mean? The values in the GenDec
column differ significantly from those in the StrCom column, but exploring these
differences is beyond the scope of this paper.
[2] Case 2: for all the ith firms, and to increase the TLPR by about
2%.
Here, x is an unknown variable. It is a trivial case in which any firm can independently
change its input (the strategy can easily be obtained by (28)). Hence, we consider a case in
which all the firms are regulated except those that meet εiai0 − bi0 = 0. From (27), we have:
from which we will get x = ±0.0625. The results including the strategies are exhibited in
Table 2. The TLPR increases by about 1.94%. The most important firm to increasing the
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TLPR is the jth, followed by the kth. Compare the values of the mth firm (esp. qm) with
those of other firms.
Table 2 Regulated results of Case 2
Firm y0 (Y0) h0 (H0) p0 (P0) y1 (Y1) h1 (H1) p1 (P1) q (Q)
J 42 28 1.5000 45.15 29.75 1.51765 1.01176
K 36 27 1.3333 38.70 28.69 1.34902 1.01176
L 18 15 1.2000 19.35 15.94 1.21412 1.01176
M 12 18 0.6667 11.10 16.88 0.65778 0.98667
N 12 12 1.0000 12.00 12.00 1.00000 1.00000
Total 120 100 1.2000 126.30 103.25 1.22324 1.01937
Firm a0 b0 1.2a0 – b0 u v StrCom GenDec
J 0.350 0.280 0.140 0.0750 0.0625 0.0088 0.0787
K 0.300 0.270 0.090 0.0750 0.0625 0.0056 0.0356
L 0.150 0.150 0.030 0.0750 0.0625 0.0019 0.0019
M 0.100 0.180 -0.060 -0.0750 -0.0625 0.0038 -0.0763
N 0.100 0.120 0.000 0 0 0 -0.0200
Total 1.000 1.000 0.0200 0.0200
Note: The subscripts (j, k, l, m, n) are suppressed; and q = p1 / p0 and Q = P1 / P0.
[3] Case 3:
As in the planned economy, we consider the problem of needing to allocate graduates
among individual firms in an industry. Here we assume that vj = 0 if εjaj0 − bj0 0.
Additionally, for simplicity it is assumed that , wherein d is an unknown
variable. We then get .
The strategies are shown in Table 3. The TLPR increases by about 1.31%. The jth firm is
the most important for increasing the TLPR, followed by the kth firm.
7.3. Multi-stage method
This method consists of five stages, each of which sees us select a single firm and
determine its input. Remember that the number of firms is 5. We use Cs in Subsection 6.2,
wherein εi is ex ante information and the subscript “0” is converted into “e” below. (Since
we must select a single firm, the strategic component calculated by (27) is no good
anymore.) Given two or more firms with the largest Cs, we may select any one of them.
When both the single-stage and multi-stage methods can be applied to solve the problem,
the TLPR derived by the latter, at least, equals that derived by the former.
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Table 3 Regulated results of Case 3
Firm y0 (Y0) h0 (H0) p0 (P0) y1 (Y1) h1 (H1) p1 (P1) q (Q)
j 42 28 1.5000 45.72 30.26 1.51118 1.00745
k 36 27 1.3333 39.08 29.10 1.34294 1.00721
l 18 15 1.2000 18.85 15.65 1.20496 1.00414
m 12 18 0.6667 12.00 18.00 0.66667 1.00000
n 12 12 1.0000 12.00 12.00 1.00000 1.00000
Total 120 100 1.2000 127.65 105.00 1.21573 1.01311
Firm a0 b0 1.1a0 – b0 u v StrCom GenDec
j 0.350 0.280 0.105 0.0886 0.0806 0.0085 0.0785
k 0.300 0.270 0.060 0.0854 0.0777 0.0047 0.0347
l 0.150 0.150 0.015 0.0475 0.0432 0.0006 0.0006
m 0.100 0.180 -0.070 0 0 0 -0.0800
n 0.100 0.120 -0.010 0 0 0 -0.0200
Total 1.000 1.000 0.0138 0.0138
Note: The subscripts (j, k, l, m, n) are suppressed; and q = p1 / p0 and Q = P1 / P0.
For convenience, we use the symbol d* (0, 1*, 2*, …, 5*) to represent the d*th stage. At
the d*th stage, we use three strategies:⦁ if εiaie − bie > 0, then vi > 0,⦁ if εiaie − bie < 0, then vi < 0,⦁ if εiaie − bie = 0, then vi = 0,
where the subscript e represents the stage and e = d* − 1. (The conventional subtraction is
adapted for two cases below. For example, 3* − 1 = 2* and 1* − 1 = 0 ≡ the initial stage.)
[4] Case 4: for all the ith firms.
This is the same as Case 1. We shall explain the method with Table 4 that shows the
result.
At the first stage, we computed the Cs for each firm. The Cs column shows the value for
each firm computed by (29). The Cs values at the d*th stage are always shown in these
columns at the d* − 1 stage. Because the mth firm had the largest Cs = (am0 − bm0)x =
0.0040, we made the mth firm decrease its input by 5%. After the execution, we computed
the new values of yi1*, hi1*, ai1*, bi1*, and so on. Some of these are exhibited in each column
at the first stage. Note that the value of the mth firm exposed in column “Cs” at the initial
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stage nearly equals (P1*/P0) − 1 = (Y1*/H1*)/(Y0/H0) − 1. The situation is similar for other
stages.
Using the first stage result, we select the firm with the largest value of Cs = (ai1* − bi1*)x,
except for the mth firm, at the second stage. This was the jth firm’s Cs = (aj1* − bj1*)x ≈
0.0035 and we then made the jth firm increase its input by 5%. We iterated these
procedures, which followed the order m → j → k → n → l. The final result is shown at the
fifth stage. The values, yi5*, hi5*, Y5*, and H5*, at this stage correspond to those, yi1, hi1, Y1,
and H1, derived by the single-stage method.
From the initial values and the results at the fifth stage, we will obtain the strategy vi =
hi5* / hi0 − 1. The TLPR was about 1.00% up. (That of Case 1 is about 0.99% up.) At the
fifth stage, we had al4* − bl4* = −0.0014 and then made the lth firm decrease its input by
5%. Compare this regulation with that of Case 1.
Table 4 Regulated results of Case 4
Firm Initial stage 1st stage 2nd stage
y (Y) h (H) Cs y (Y) h (H) Cs y (Y) h (H) Cs
j 42.00 28.00 0.00350 42.00 28.00 0.00346 44.10 29.40
k 36.00 27.00 0.00150 36.00 27.00 0.00145 36.00 27.00 0.00138
l 18.00 15.00 0.00000 18.00 15.00 0.00003 18.00 15.00 0.00006
m 12.00 18.00 0.00400 11.40 17.10 11.40 17.10
n 12.00 12.00 0.00100 12.00 12.00 0.00103 12.00 12.00 0.00103
Total 120.00 100.00 119.40 99.10 121.50 100.50
Firm 3rd stage 4th stage 5th stage
y (Y) h (H) Cs y (Y) h (H) Cs y (Y) h (H) q (Q)
j 44.10 29.40 44.10 29.40 44.10 29.40 1
k 37.80 28.35 37.80 28.35 37.80 28.35 1
l 18.00 15.00 0.00006 18.00 15.00 0.00007 17.10 14.25 1
m 11.40 17.10 11.40 17.10 11.40 17.10 1
n 12.00 12.00 0.00102 11.40 11.40 11.40 11.40 1
Total 123.30 101.85 122.70 101.25 121.80 100.50 1.00995
Note: The subscripts are suppressed; and q = p5* /p0 and Q = P5* /P0.
[5] Case 5: for all the ith firms, and H1 = H0.
In practice, we may have to consider such a constraint in a certain industry in which
total labor inputs are set by H1 = H0.We add this constrain to the conditions in Case 1.
Because the decreased inputs are crucial, this method may be the best means of yielding the
solution.
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Table 5 Regulated results of Case 5
Firm Initial stage 1st stage 2nd stage
y (Y) h (H) Cs y (Y) h (H) Cs y (Y) h (H) Cs
j 42.00 28.00 42.00 28.00 42.00 28.00
k 36.00 27.00 36.00 27.00 36.00 27.00
l 18.00 15.00 18.00 15.00 0.00003 18.00 15.00 0.00004
m 12.00 18.00 0.00400 11.40 17.10 11.40 17.10
n 12.00 12.00 0.00100 12.00 12.00 0.00103 11.40 11.40
Total 120.00 100.00 119.40 99.10 118.80 98.50
Firm 3rd stage 4th stage 5th stage
y (Y) h (H) Cs y (Y) h (H) Cs y (Y) h (H) q (Q)
j 42.00 28.00 0.00349 44.10 29.40 44.10 29.40 1
k 36.00 27.00 0.00146 36.00 27.00 0.00087 37.13 27.85 1
l 17.10 14.25 17.10 14.25 17.10 14.25 1
m 11.40 17.10 11.40 17.10 11.40 17.10 1
n 11.40 11.40 11.40 11.40 11.40 11.40 1
Total 117.90 97.75 120.00 99.15 121.13 100.00 1.00944
Note: The subscripts are suppressed; and q = p5* /p0 and Q = P5* /P0.
Our method comprises of two parts, namely, the decreasing input and the increasing
input. We explain the method using Table 5 that shows the result.
In the first part, we select the ith firm that satisfies aie − bie < 0 and has the largest Cs at
the d*th stage, and make this firm decrease its input by 5% as in Case 4. The order was m
→n → l. We also computed the decreased-input sum h* = 0.05(hm0 + hn1* + hl2*) = 2.25.
In the second part, we allocate the sum to the other firms (the jth and kth firms). Our
procedures are as follows. At the fourth stage, we select a firm that satisfies ai3* − bi3* > 0
and has the largest Cs. This was the jth firm. So, we computed h*/ hj3* = ω4* ≈ 0.080 > 0.05.
(If ω4* ≤ 0.05, we will make the jth firm increase its input by 100ω4* percent and finish the
allocation.) Thus we made the jth firm increase its input by 5% and computed the residual
h** = h* − 0.05hj3* = 0.85 > 0. At the fifth stage, we had ak4* − bk4* > 0 and computed h**/
hk4* = ω5* ≈ 0.0315 < 0.05. Hence we made the kth firm increase its input by 100ω5*
percent.
From the initial values and the results at the fifth stage, we will obtain the strategy vi =
hi5* / hi0 − 1. While the mth, nth and lth firms decreased their inputs by 5%, the jth and kth
firms increased their inputs, respectively, by 5% and about 3.15%. Note that H0 ≈ H5*. The
TLPR was increased by about 0.94%.
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8. Concluding remarks
In this study, we have derived the single-handed and double-handed aggregative
formulae for labor productivity quotient at the firm-level. Using one of these formulae, we
have focused on the strategic decomposition of TLPR. Assuming a planned economy, we
considered a situation wherein a government had to regulate TLPR in a certain industry.
Our problem then becomes how to increase TLPR by as much as possible during a few
years, a problem that can be solved by the strategic decomposition. We have demonstrated
how to apply our strategic decomposition to the problem using numerical examples.
This paper shows many aggregative formulae, some of which are systematically derived
herein. These formulae derive different values for each firm’s contribution to TLPQ (or
TLPR). Relevant questions are whether one aggregative formula is superior to the others,
and the meaning of the aggregative formulae. Based on the above discussions and the
results shown in Appendix C, the formulae are unlikely to have practical meanings.
Therefore we want to leave this matter open.
Subjects such as our strategic decomposition and its applications have never been
examined, and so we make some remarks on them as follows.
1) How to increase TLPR
To solve this problem, we have proposed single-stage and multi-stage methods. Our
strategic decomposition (27) can be used with both of these methods.
2) Ex ant information against ex post information
To regulate TLPR, we must use ex ant information such as two shares at the base period
(ai0 and bi0) and also use the two control variables (ui and vi). If all the firms’ u-v ratios εi
defined by (19) are ex ant information, our control variables turn out an N-vector of the
firms’ input changes (N is the number of firms). To regulate TLPR, ex post information
such as two shares at the comparison period (ai1 and bi1) is not helpful. Remember that ai1 is
dependent on all firms’ uj and bi1 is dependent on all firms’ vj. Notably, the single-handed
additive aggregations ((5) and (6)) and all the multiplicative aggregations ((13), (14), (15),
(16), and so on) demand ex post information as these arguments. See also (32) and (34) in
Appendix A.
3) Most important signal
If all εi are ex ant information as above, the most important signal to regulate TLPR is εiai0
− bi0 (the difference between the ith firm’s weighted output share at the base period and its
input share). This material fact is easily understood from the discussions in Section 7.
While we repeatedly demonstrated major roles for ai0 and bi0, εi is also a key player in the
regulation of TLPR, being related to TFP and capital.
4) Misleading signal
To increase TLPQ (or TLPR), firm productivity at the base period pi0 and the quotients
pi1/pi0 are misleading signals. It is false to say that reallocation of labor from the lower-
productivity firm to the higher-productivity firm will produce total labor productivity
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growth (i.e., P1/P0 > 1)17 and that productivity growth at the firm-level (i.e., pi1/pi0 > 1) will
lead to productivity growth at the industry-level.18
5) Requisite information
The data needed for the regulation of TLPR are firms’ (or industries’) two shares (ai0 and
bi0) and u-v ratios (εi) that can be used as ex ante information; and their control variables
(vi) whose values or ranges are determined by something as in Subsections 7.2 and 7.3.
Presently we can access some databases at the industry-level, such as EU KLEMS and
OECD STAN.19 The former provides annual measures of outputs and inputs at the
industry-level for many countries, from which we can produce the two shares at the base
period20 and u-v ratios. Examining these data for Japan and the United States, we found the
annual variations of outputs and inputs to be relatively small (so (22) holds at the industry-
level for developed countries such as Japan). However, we found the u-v ratios to have
very large annual variations, and thus the u-v ratios at the industry-level are not used as ex
ant information.21 Estimating the u-v ratio at a firm-level may be easy and that at an
industry-level may not; and they are beyond the scope of this paper. For these topics
including the database, see CompNet task force (2014).
17 Dynamic allocative efficiency by Haltiwanger (2011) is this reallocation of resources including
labor.
18 See the essential strategies and Table 1 in Section 7.
19 Available at http://www.euklems.net, and http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org.
20 Naturally, we can use these shares as ex ante information.
21 These results are available from the author upon request.
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Appendix A: Other formulae of total labor productivity quotient
We shall briefly discuss other formulae of TLPQ not covered in Sections 2 and 3. As
above, we use two fundamental relations derived from :
(30)
(31)
Multiplying both sides in (30) by one of the shares (or these ratios) and summing over all
the firms, we obtain a single-handed (or double-handed) additive formula. Similarly,
multiplying both sides in (31) by a logarithmic mean of one of the shares (or these ratios)
and summing over all the firms yields a single-handed (or double-handed) multiplicative
formula.
First, we show the single-handed formula. Multiplying both sides in (30) by ai1 and
summing over all the firms, we obtain (5). Replacing ai1 with bi0, we can derive (6).
Multiplying both sides in (31) by L(ai) and summing over all the firms yields (13).
Replacing L(ai) with L(bi), we can derive the other multiplicative formula shown in
Subsection 3.3.
Next, we show the double-handed formulae. Multiplying both sides in (30) by
and summing over all the firms yields:
(32)
Similarly, multiplying both sides in the above by and summing over all the firms,
we obtain another double-handed additive formula:
(33)
Comparing (33) with (32), we see that the former causes the IN-C and the latter does not
(see the next appendix).
Multiplying both sides in (31) by and summing over all the firms, we find the
multiplicative formula:
,
or
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(34)
wherein we used the logarithmic mean:
and . To enable the ith firm to contribute to the
logarithmic TLPQ without doing anything, we have only to assume .22 Compare
this property with those of (15), (16), and (17). If the logarithmic mean can be
approximated by the geometric mean G(x), that is, L(x) ≈ G(x) ≡ (x1x0)0.5, we have
Substituting this approximation into (34), we can see that (34) corresponds to (32).
Replacing with , we have:.
wherein L(bi/ai) is defined similarly to the above and
. While this corresponds to (33), it does not cause the IN-C (see
also the next appendix).
Ingenious procedures can convert (34) into a novel form. We obtain the following
relations from the logarithmic means L(P) and L(pi):23
These relations and (34) produce the novel form given by
22 If .
23 Taking the logarithm of both sides in the first relation, we can find the definition of L(P). The
same can be done for other relations.
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(35)
Here It is important to bear in mind that we must first
calculate the term in the left (or right) braces if ΔP (or Δpi) approaches zero.
If P1/P0 ≠ 1 (i.e., ΔP ≠ 0) and pi1/pi0 ≠ 1 (i.e., Δpi ≠ 0) for all i, we obtain the TLPQ as
follows:
which is the weighted geometric mean of the firm’s productivity quotient pi1 / pi0; and the
weight is and may be negative.
Appendix B: Invariable contribution to total labor productivity growth
We shall demonstrate that some aggregations connote a firm’s invariable contribution to
TLPQ, logarithmic TLPQ, or TLPR. This defect (i.e., IN-C) occurs in all single-handed
aggregations and some double-handed additive aggregations. We can find the defect if each
firm’s contribution is given by:
where xi is independent of one or both of the two control variables ui and vi while
Usually, xi is decomposed into some factors (see, for example, Reinsdorf 2015). We can
also produce variants, such as
where zi is independent of the two control variables, P0zi is a predetermined variable,
and
As an additive form, we take (5), (33), and (20). From the extreme right of (5), we can
see that this formula cannot mirror changes in firm inputs. Consider the example where
output changes do not occur for all firms despite changes in their inputs. Herein, ui = 0, vi >
0, and ai1 = ai0 for all i. Thus, the TLPQ is
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There are many vectors v = {vi} that meet , where d is any constant. Provided
that the firms’ input changes are any one of these vectors, P1/P0 remains constant and thus
each firm’s contribution as derived by (5) is also constant. (Note that ai1 in (5) is
independent of vi and bi0 in (6) is independent of ui and vi.)
Additionally, many sets of two vectors u = {ui} and v = {vi} produce the same P1/P0, and
each pi0 is independent of the two control variables. Thus, it is evident that (33) causes the
IN-C. (Compare this property with that derived by (32). Recall that pi1 is dependent of the
two control variables.)
The familiar decomposition (20) causes a defect similar to (5), since the awkward
expansion on its right hand side leads to
wherein we used the relations such as and so on (t = 0 and
1). Naturally, the final result is directly obtained from the following numerator of (20):
= .
From the example in (5) above, we have ai1 = ai0 for all i. Thus we have
As a multiplicative form, we take (13) and (14). From (13) and (31), we have
because . (Compare the final formula with (34), which is the double-
handed formula). Thus, firms’ contributions to the logarithmic TLPQ derived by (13)
cannot reflect changes in their inputs, since are independent of all the control
variables vj.
Similarly, (14) leads to
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wherein we used (note that
).
Table 6 Each firm’s contribution to TLPR
Firm Equation Approximations
(20) (21) (23) (25)
j 0.01441 0.07875 -0.06136 0.07845
k 0.01235 0.03563 -0.02353 0.03490
l 0.00617 0.00187 0.00276 0.00128
m -0.01041 -0.07625 0.07932 -0.07409
n -0.00315 -0.02000 0.02121 -0.02061
Total 0.01937 0.02000 0.01840 0.01994
Appendix C: Firms’ contributions to TLPR
We shall exemplify the firms’ contributions to the TLPR derived by (20), (21), (23), and
(25). Table 6 exhibits these values using the results shown in Table 2. (The values derived
by (21) have already been shown in Table 2.) The values of firms’ contributions vary in
accordance with the formulae. Additionally, all the formulae have negative values. The
meaning of these negative values is an important question, particularly given that our
essential strategies always produce non-negative strategic components.
